The Constitutional Discipline of Assent: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Recalibration of Article 200

Abstract

This paper critically analyses the constitutional debate regarding the discretionary powers vested in the Governor of the State within the legislative framework as specified by Article 200 of the Constitution of India, a persistent challenge to India's federal structure. The paper examines the reasons this provision has become a contentious issue between elected state governments and centrally appointed governors, resulting in legislative impasse. It delves into the historical context by analysing what the Constituent Assembly meant by the provision. The main focus is a doctrinal analysis of the Supreme Court's important decision in The State of Tamil Nadu v The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr (2025), which clears up the confusion about what happens in gubernatorial inaction and the purported ‘veto’ powers. This paper argues that the judgment significantly curtails gubernatorial overreach by establishing judicially enforceable timelines, clarifying that withholding assent is not an absolute veto but a procedural step requiring legislative reconsideration, and affirming the general primacy of the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The paper concludes by proposing implementable suggestions, including constitutional amendments to codify the Court's directives and reforms in the appointment process of Governors, to ensure the enduring legacy of this judicial intervention in strengthening parliamentary democracy and cooperative federalism.